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A

ndrew Futter and Herbert Lin have written recent and similarly
titled books—which, for clarity, I will refer to as Hacking the
Bomb and Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons, respectively—
aimed at helping senior government policymakers confront the complex
interactions between modern cyberspace operations and nuclear operations.
The outstanding sources both authors identify reflect their seriousness
and credibility as researchers. But—remarkably—their books are tepid
in content and offer little new information for the cyber-nuclear dialogue.
Andrew Futter, a professor of international politics at the University
of Leicester, has published an impressive list of publications on nuclear
weapons, missile defense, and cyberspace. In Hacking the Bomb, he aims
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“to assess, examine, and explore what this new global [cyber-nuclear] context
means” for nuclear weapons, forces, and strategy (4). He posits this task
is based on two dynamics: increasing use of information technology in nuclear
weapons management and emerging new cyber capabilities. He organizes his
treatise into four parts addressing the nature of the cyber-nuclear challenge,
what hackers might do to nuclear systems, the cyber-nuclear nexus at the
strategic level, and challenges for the cyber-nuclear future.
Part I of Hacking the Bomb begins with an abridged historical
contextualization of the “cyber challenge,” as Futter calls it, “involving four
different domains of analysis: physical/mechanical, logical, informational,
and human/cognitive” (23). Futter rails against the imprecise language
that clouds ongoing cyber debate, but he uses imprecise and inconsistent
terminology. With his context established, Futter explores the vulnerabilities
of nuclear systems and their implications for the goal of ensuring
weapons are always available when properly initiated but never available
to unauthorized users. He emphasizes the increasing complexity of such
command-and-control processes and suggests “a key part of the cyber
challenge for nuclear systems security will be intrinsic, and not involve any
attackers at all”—that is, normal accidents may be more likely to occur (45).
Part II opens with a concise summary of information breaches at the
Departments of Defense and Energy with implications for nuclear weapon
development. He surmises the cyber-espionage threat “probably represents
more than 90 percent of the cyber challenge that we currently face in the nuclear
realm” (69). Such statements are indicative of Futter’s cavalier prioritization
within his analysis that undermines the credibility of his synthesis.
After all, are readers to believe the other material in this book addresses less than
10 percent of the cyber challenge? The remaining chapter of Part II explores
how cyberattacks could lead to the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons
or the disruption of authorized use. It largely rehashes well-known historical
cases of cyberattack of nonnuclear systems and includes another account
of Stuxnet.
Part III focuses on the strategic level of nuclear weapons and cyber
deterrence with a discussion marred by simplifications and debatable
assertions. Futter reveals his implicit bias of viewing cyber operations
in Clausewitzian terms while treating nuclear operations as Jominian.
To wit, Futter declares, “though we have come to understand just how
powerful and destructive nuclear weapons are during the past seventy years,
the same cannot yet be said for the diverse range of threats posed by the
much newer cyber challenge” (95). Unlike atomic bombs, thermonuclear
weapons have never been used in combat. Thus, while the immediate
effects of nuclear warheads may be characterized by tests and analyses, the

Review Essay

Caton

151

strategic effects of actual nuclear conflict remain unknown. To his credit,
Futter raises the topic of a US declaratory nuclear policy with regard
to potential aggression in cyberspace, citing the foundational 2011
International Strategy for Cyberspace. Yet, his narrative on how cyber
operations may affect nuclear escalation is an unbalanced collage of existing
issues surrounding an emerging “cyber-nuclear security dilemma”—a term
he fails to define (119). Fixed on the negative implications of cyberspace,
he fails to consider how information provided through cyberspace may
enhance lucid decision making.
In Part IV, Futter examines nuclear weapon modernization and advanced
conventional weapons through the lens of technological determinism
where “technology drives social and societal change” (132). He tackles this
broad topic by describing potential military capabilities with vague cybernuclear connections. The chapter concludes with unfounded speculation
about a potential revolution in nuclear affairs and the third nuclear
age. Hacking the Bomb ends with a whimper, its final chapter laden
with adages and conjecture about the cyber-nuclear future. Despite his
preceding insights, Futter can muster only three trifling recommendations:
develop a consensus on what the term cyber means; protect nuclear systems
against direct cyberattacks; and include cyber operations in other emerging
strategic dynamics, such as nuclear arms control.
Hacking the Bomb promises a fecund discussion with a propitious
opportunity to expand the dialogue surrounding the strategic use of cyber
and nuclear capabilities. But its delivery is often repetitive and wordy
with a diluted sense of priority in analysis—Futter identifies too many
issues as the central concern. Certainly, much serious work went into the
research of the book—to which its impressive, well-documented array of
authoritative references attest. But its lack of a congruent lexicon or balanced
analyses facilitates an ambiguous and unilateral discussion neither favorable
to educate novices nor to inform serious decisionmakers.
Herbert Lin holds research positions at Stanford University’s Center
for International Security and Cooperation and Hoover Institution.
A recognized expert on policy-related aspects of cybersecurity with a list
of publications on par with Futter, Lin has little discernable experience
with nuclear weapons. His version of Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons
walks readers through background material and cyber-nuclear context,
cybersecurity lessons for nuclear modernization, nuclear scenarios
with cyber risks, and imperatives for the future. His target audience
is White House and congressional policymakers who will influence the next
Nuclear Posture Review. Lin claims “[t]his book addresses the relationship
to and possible impact of cyber technology on all aspects on U.S. nuclear
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forces and operations” (ix). With this statement, Lin establishes a vast—
but ultimately unachieved—scope of effort.
The first two chapters of the book provide very basic information
on cyberspace and nuclear operations. Although the use of artificial
intelligence is increasing in many cyberspace applications, Lin wisely defers
any related discussions to other venues. While he notes the 2018 Nuclear
Posture Review includes strategically significant language “to indicate that
the United States might contemplate a nuclear response to certain kinds
of cyber attack” he explicitly decides not to address it in the book (27).
His examples of cyberattacks—such as those on Sony Pictures, the Office
of Personnel Management, and US election media sites—have no direct
connection to nuclear operations.
While Lin’s third chapter on the US nuclear enterprise is the longest
chapter, it is far from comprehensive. Its content reveals Lin’s forte
is cyberspace, and that his aptitude for strategic nuclear affairs is questionable.
A major portion of the chapter rehashes a 2019 report by the US Government
Accountability Office that explored cyber vulnerabilities for weapon systems.
Inexplicably, Lin completely ignores the 2019 version of Joint Publication
3-72, Nuclear Operations—a document that should be mandatory for anyone
exploring an authoritative model of the nuclear enterprise.
The fourth chapter, “Cybersecurity Lessons for Nuclear Modernization,”
is short and forgettable. Its content has little direct relevance to anything
nuclear, with only examples of mundane issues, such as physical security,
Internet service outages, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The next chapter
presents six scenarios designed to highlight cyber risks in nuclear crises, the
first four of which are predictable and basic. The other two scenarios do not
involve direct cyberattack on nuclear systems but deal instead with the use of
social media to influence decisionmakers. Unfortunately, Lin does not discuss
the concepts of information warfare and strategic communication that would
contextualize such indirect attacks facilitated by means of cyberspace.
The sixth chapter is the book’s intended core contribution to the
cyber-nuclear dialogue and offers six observations and eight imperatives.
None of the observations are original, and most involve cyber risks
applicable to all modern weapons systems. The fourth observation,
“[t]he legacy NC3 [nuclear command, control, and communications]
has not failed catastrophically since 1985,” is notable in that Lin neglects
to give readers any clue as to what happened in 1985 (134). The companion
eight imperatives are equally unremarkable—neither new nor unique to the
nuclear enterprise. Like Futter, Lin’s final chapter attempts to convince readers
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that the book provides a novel way ahead for decisionmakers to address
cybersecurity in ongoing nuclear modernization efforts.
The back cover of Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons declares the work is
“the first book to consider cyber risks across the entire nuclear enterprise.”
Clearly, this claim is erroneous, considering Lin cites Futter’s Hacking the
Bomb and fails to address significant portions of the nuclear enterprise. Like
Futter, Lin often repeats himself and does not apply consistent terms and
logic in his analysis. In fact, the unique and topical material in Lin’s tome
likely could be reduced to the length of a Parameters article. Such a concise
and focused piece might better draw the attention of busy staffers in any
presidential administration.
Both books suffer from at least three fatal flaws: scope, context,
and military operations. First, Futter and Lin opt to tackle a research
scope far too broad for a single book. The lack of systematic approaches
for their analyses as well as blurring of the tactical, operational, and strategic
aspects of both cyber and nuclear operations further hamper their work.
In each book, nuclear war theory is simplified as a consensus dialogue
vice a nuanced and evolving debate, though, to be fair, any detailed
discussion of cyber or nuclear operations quickly enters the realm
of classified information.
One could reduce the book’s shared central themes to: cyber operations are
dangerous; nuclear operations are dangerous; and mixing cyber and nuclear
operations makes both more dangerous. Yet, neither author clearly defines
the term cyber threat nor even risk. They do not consider the customary
model of military risk as a function of the consequences for a given event
and the probability of its occurrence. Including such context would help the
authors add sorely needed objective priority to their musings. Finally, like
the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Futter and Lin claim to consider the global
environment of US nuclear weapons but provide only cursory treatment
of other nuclear powers.
For military operations, neither book mentions the evolving mission
of US Strategic Command, which, in addition to its current missions
of nuclear strike and integrated missile defense, was the birthplace
of US Cyber Command. Futter and Lin foster the latent impression that
military nuclear planners are unaware of the challenges and complexities
hawked in their books—a great disservice to those leaders who made the
current multibillion-dollar upgrade of the nuclear enterprise possible.
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In summary, Futter and Lin do not fulfill their self-assigned goals.
Both books are too convoluted for casual readers and too imprecise
for an informed audience. Of the two works, Hacking the Bomb is the better
by far. Prospective readers would do well to read the last chapter of either
book first to decide if the authors’ destinations are worth the arduous
journeys through their prose.

